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I. INTRODUCTION
In Wellenkamp v. Bank of America I the California Supreme Court
* Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; A.B.
Stanford University, 1972; J.D. University of California at Los Angeles, 1975. I wish to thank my
research assistant, Mr. William Hardy, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
Publication of this article was made possible by the Amicus Lex Seminar and Lecture program of
the McGeorge Alumni Association.
1. 21 Cal.3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). The court in Wellenkamp was
required to construe California Civil Code section 711 which states: "Conditions restraining
alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void." Wellenkamp itself was the latest
development in a recent series of California Supreme Court opinions restricting the use of due-on-
sales clauses in various contexts. In Wellenkamp the Court was concerned with the effect of the
clause in an outright sale, that is, "any sale by the trustor of property wherein legal title (and
usually possession) is transferred." 21 Cal.3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
In Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal.2d 312, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), there was
an agreement against encumberance or transfer of the property. The Court recognized that such
an agreement restrains alienation but held the restraint tolerable, so long as it was reasonable
under the circumstances.
La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal.3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971),
involved a different restriction- that of a due-on-encumbrance clause. This type of provision
gives the lender the right to accelerate the loan balance not simply because of sale, but due to
further encumbrancing of the property. The Court allowed this form of restraint only as long as it
was necessary to protect the lender's security. La Sala provoked legislation speaking to the prob-
lem, CAL. CIv. CODE §2949. This section prevents acceleration of loan obligations on further
encumbrance; section 2924.6 applied the same concept to residential dwellings of from one to four
units.
Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal.3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974),
was the most clear signal of the imminency of Wellenkamp and was the case that sparked FHLBB
action on due-on-sales clauses. Tucker involved an installment land sale contract. There the
court held that the restraints caused by acceleration were unreasonable. In so doing it fashioned
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effectively prohibited real property lenders from using the due-on-sales
clause,2 a provision commonly found in lending instruments,3 as a de-
vice to rid investment portfolios of unprofitable loans. Wellenkamp ap-
peared in 1978, just when savings and loan associations began to feel
the economic squeeze created by rising interest rates and keen competi-
tion among lenders for investment dollars.' Prior to Wellenkamp, lend-
ers had begun to use the due-on-sales clause to ease this pressure by
retiring or forcing the renegotiation of old loans made below the pre-
vailing market rate. The California Supreme Court blocked this strat-
egy by limiting the ability of lenders to accelerate loan balances on
transfer or encumbrance of property to rare situations; thus, easy as-
sumption of existing loans by new buyers became the public policy of
the state.
Eventually, powerful interest groups-realtors, consumers and lend-
ers-were pitted against each other in the federal and state legislative
arenas over the issue.' The controversy and consternation provoked by
the test later to be used in Wellenkamp to determine the validity of due-on clauses in particular
circumstances, that is, whether the quantum of restraint resulting through discretionary use of the
clause, and the resulting "chill" on alienation, is justified by the lender's need to protect its
security.
2. The "due-on-sales" clause is a provision allowing acceleration of the outstanding balance
due on a loan. As the Court defined it in Wellenkamp:
"A due-on clause is a device commonly used in real property security transactions to
provide at the option of the lender, for acceleration of the maturity of the loan upon the
sale, alienation or further encumbering of the real property security."
Wellenkamp, 21 Cal.3d at 946 n.l, 582 P.2d at 971, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
3. Section 17 of the uniform mortgage instrument of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Association is used in many loan agreements and
reads in pertinent part:
17. Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all or any part of the Property or an inter-
est therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent,
excluding (a) the creation of a lien of encumbrance subordinate to this Deed of Trust,
(b) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances,
(c) transfer by devise, descent or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant or
(d) the grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to
purchase, Lender may, at Lenders option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed of
Trust to be immediately due andpayable. Lender shall have waived such option to accel-
erate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and the person to whom the Property is to
be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit of such person is satis-
factory to Lender and that the interestpayable on the sums secured by this Deed of Trust
shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. (Emphasis added.)
The option to accelerate the balance due on an original loan where resale is contemplated allows
the lender to force the pay off of the old loan balance, or to negotiate a new, higher rate on the
loan with new buyers. In either case, the lender has rid itself of an old loan at obsolete rates.
4. California Association of Realtors, Acceleration Upon Sale of Residential Property
(statement of opposition to Assembly Bill 2158, May 4, 1981) [hereinafter referred to as Opposi-
tion Statement of May 4, 1981] (copy on file at the Pacfc Law Journal).
5. See Wellenkamp, 21 Cal.3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385; Dawn Invest-
ment Co. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal3d 695, 703-04, 639 P.2d 974, 978, 180 Cal. Rptr. 335, 336
(1982).
6. In California, legislation sponsored by lenders was immediately introduced to overturn
Wellenkamp after the case appeared. See A.B. 848, Cal. Leg., 1978-79 Regular Sess.; A.B. 790,
Cal. Leg., 1980-81 Regular Sess.; A.B. 2158, Cal. Leg., 1980-81 Regular Sess. In 1981, federal
legislation to preempt the issue for all lenders was introduced. See S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981). None of this proposed legislation has been enacted. Assembly Bills 848 and 790 did not
reach the Assembly floor for a vote; Assembly Bill 2158 never came out of policy committee.
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Wellenkamp were exacerbated by the important questions it left open.7
The most significant of these, and one which may have sparked a
revolution in the system of state and federal savings and loans and
banks, was that of Wellenkamp's applicability to federally chartered in-
stitutions.' On June 28, 1982, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed this question in Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Reginald de la Cuesta9 establishing that California's restriction on the
use of due-on-sales clauses, as well as those of numerous other states
following a similar policy' 0 had been preempted by federal agency
regulation. I
The most immediate impact of De la Cuesta was to increase the flight
of state savings and loan associations to the federal system.'2 This has
resulted in further stagnation of the home sales market due to the un-
Senate Bill 1720 was put out of the Senate Banking Committee after significant amendment on
August 19, 1982, and further action on it is expected in the fall of this year.
7. See Wellenkamp, 21 Cal.3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86. See
generaly Crane, Wellenkamp v. Bank f4merica: 4 Victoryfor the Consumer, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
275, 299-305 (1979); Musacchio, 4 Casefor Preemption: Wellenkamp v. Bank ofAmerica is Inap-
plicable to Federal Savings and Loans, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219, 221 (1980).
8. See generaly Crane, supra note 7; telephone interview with Robert Wolfe, California
Department of Savings and Loans on September 1, 1982 [hereinafter referred to as conversation
with Robert Wolfe] (according to information gathered by Mr. Wolfe's staff, since 1981, 32 Cali-
fornia savings and loan associations have gone to federal charter or have merged with federal
associations); 46 Fed. Reg. 46,964 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 30) (proposed September
23, 1981) (by this proposed regulation, national banks as well as federal savings and loans will
have the right to accelerate loans through due-on clauses without regard to state law).
9. 50 U.S.L.W. 4916 (U.S. June 28, 1982). De la Cuesta was the first of a number of cases
involving due-on clauses to reach the United States Supreme Court for review, though the issue
had already been addressed by some federal district courts. Most of these lower courts concluded
that state law had been preempted by the FHLBB regulation. See Price v. Florida Federal Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 524 F. Supp. 175, 178 (ND Fla. 1981); First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson,
516 F. Supp. 732, 740 (ND Fla. 1981); Dantus v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 502 F. Supp.
658, 661 (Colo. 1980); Bailey v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n., 467 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (CD
Ill. 1979). But see, Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 308 N.W.2d 471,
475-78 (Minn. 1981).
In De la Cuesta, appellees purchased property from various borrowers of Fidelity Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association [hereinafter referred to as Fidelity]. The original borrowers had given
as security for their loans deeds of trust on the properties that contained due-on-sales clauses.
When Fidelity learned of each transfer, it gave notice of its intention to enforce the due-on-sales
clauses, but offered, alternatively, to consent to the transfers and waive acceleration rights if the
new buyers would agree to a higher interest rate on the loans. They refused, the accelerated loans
were not paid and foreclosure proceedings were instituted. Each new buyer filed a suit in the
Superior Court of California for Orange County seeking a declaration that Wellenkamp prevented
acceleration, and injunctive relief against foreclosure and damages. The Superior Court consoli-
dated the actions and then granted summary judgment for Fidelity on the ground that federal law
had preempted California's due-on-sales restrictions. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District reversed, petition for hearing in the California Supreme Court was denied and
the United States Supreme Court then noted probable jurisdiction.
10. For instance, at the time of the decision, the following states had joined in an Amicus
brief of the State of Michigan in support of appellees: Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mex-
ico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington and
Wisconsin. Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of Michigan, De La Cuesta; [hereinafter referred to
as Brief of Michigan] (copy on fie at the Pacific Law Journal).
11. De la Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4920.
12. Telephone conversation with Ron Kingston, California Association of Realtors (Septem-
ber 2, 1982).
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certainty created by these newly "federal" institutions claiming that
they may exercise due-on-sales clauses in transactions entered into
after Wellenkamp but before their metamorphosis. 13  A protracted
round of litigation over this issue, ending again in United States
Supreme Court resolution, is expected. 14 Not surprisingly, strong pres-
sure on the California Legislature to provide "parity" to state lenders
by legislatively overruling Wellenkamp has increased."
De la Cuesta, however, has far greater significance than its immedi-
ate effect on the housing market and the legislative stalemate over as-
sumptions. The rights of home owners and lenders affected by the due-
on-sales clause in a lending agreement can be most accurately charac-
terized as individual contract and property rights. These rights involve
substantive law issues which generally have been reserved to the states
for resolution. 6 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in De la Cuesta
found that California's substantive law determining the proper use of
the due-on-sales clause has been preempted by a regulation of the Fed-
eral Home Loan Bank Board (hereinafter referred to as the FHLBB)
that was issued in 1976 and that only ambiguously establishes the fed-
eral policy in this area.' Thus, De la Cuesta might fairly be described
13. See San Francisco Chronicle, July 15, 1982, at 29, col. 4; see also, California Board of
Realtors, Proposed Legislation to Reverse California Law on Mortgage Loan Assumability (state-
ment of opposition, July 13, 1982) sec. III. K. [hereinafter referred to as Opposition Statement of
July 13] (copy on file at the Pacfic Law Journal).
14. For two recent California cases disputing the right of converted associations to exercise
due-on clauses, see Arnstein v. World Sav. Ass'n., No. Civ. 506095 (Santa Clara Co. Sup. Ct. filed
August 18, 1982) and Halter v. World Sav. Assn., No. C418533 (Los Angeles Co. Sup. Ct. filed
July 20, 1982).
15. See generaly Opposition Statement of July 13, supra note 13; Tentative Proposal: Loan
Assumability of July 28, 1982 [hereinafter referred to as Tentative Proposal] (copy on file with
Pacfic Law Journal). This proposed settlement provided the basis for discussions between repre-
sentatives of lenders and realtors and was hoped to result in compromise legislation emanating
from the just ended 1981-82 California legislative session. "Settlement" discussions broke down
and no legislation resulted.
16. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Butner v. United
States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979); cf, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479-493 (1973).
17. 12 C.F.R. §545.8-3(f) (1981). This regulation originally appeared as 12 C.F.R. §564.6-
11(f). See 44 Fed. Reg. 39108, 39149 (1979). The text of the regulation is as follows:
(f) Due-on-sale clauses. An association continues to have the power to include, as a
matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instrument
whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable sums
secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real property
securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's prior
written consent. Except as provided in paragraph (g) of this section with respect to loans
made after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or to be occupied by the
borrower, exercise by the association of such option (hereafter called a due-on-sale
clause) shall be exclusively governed by the terms of the loan contract, and all rights and
remedies of the association and borrower shall be fixed and governed by that contract.
(g) Limitations on the exercise of due-on-sale clauses. With respect to any loan made
after July 31, 1976, on the security of a home occupied or to be occupied by the bor-
rower, a Federal association: (1) Shall not exercise a due-on-sale clause because of
(i) creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the association's security in-
strument, (ii) creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances;
(iii) transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant; or
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as a striking intrusion on state prerogatives. Certainly it gives added
impetus to current Congressional efforts to enact national due-on-sales
legislation that will apply to all real property lenders, state or federal.
Thus, De la Cuesta is important for several reasons: (1) by creating a
dichotomy between state and federal savings and loans on the due-on-
sale issue it intensifies pressure at the state level for legislators to create
parity between state and federal institutions and to experiment with
real property finance; (2) due to the economic uncertainty created by
this dichotomy, De la Cuesta may have elevated an issue of serious
local concern to one of national importance, thus buttressing the legal
basis for federal legislation in the area; and finally, (3) De la Cuesta
may be the harbinger of increased federal encroachment on individual
contract and property rights through the vehicle of the preemption doc-
trine. This article will discuss the legal framework giving rise to the De
la Cuesta opinion and its economic context. It will then describe in
more detail the practical impact of the decision. Throughout, it will
focus on the implications of De la Cuesta and related cases for the con-
tinued vitality of the preemption principle.
II. PREEMPTION-THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF DE LA CUESTA
State law pertaining to matters generally within the sovereign power
of states (for example, property law and family law) may still be invali-
dated by the preemption doctrine if it conflicts with or frustrates the
purpose of federal law validly made. 8 However, before state law must
(iv) granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to
purchase; (2) shall not impose a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration of
the loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause; and (3) waives its option to exercise a due-on-
sale clause as to a speefc transfer if, before the transfer, the association and theperson to
whom theproperty is to be sold or transferred (the existing borrower's successor in inter-
est) agree in writing that theperson's credit is satisfactory to the association and that interest
on sums secured by the association's security interest will be payable at a rate the association
shall request. Upon such agreement and resultant waiver the association shall release
the existing borrower from all obligations under the loan instruments, and the associa-
tion is deemed to have made a new loan to the existing borrower's successor in interest.
(emphasis added).
18. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) ("The relative importance to the State of its
own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our
Constitution provided that the federal law must prevail."); see also, McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S.
210, 232-33 (1981), Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54-55, (1981).
Constitutional authority for the preemption doctrine derives from the supremacy clause, U.S.
CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2, which provides:
This Constitution and the law of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.
For federal law to have preemptive force it must derive from the constitutionally permissable
exercise of federal power. Theoretically, the federal government is one of enumerated and, there-
fore, limited powers. See, U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution
recognizes this principle and reserves to the States powers not specifically allocated to the federal
sphere. See, U.S. Const. amend. X. Nonetheless, countless Supreme Court opinions have estab-
lished "beyond peradventure" that the commerce clause by itself is a "grant of plenary authority
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give way to federal law in the face of the supremacy clause, a 'clear
manifestation' of intent to preempt must be found.'9 Clear Congres-
sional authorization to preempt is especially important where the law
to be displaced falls traditionally within the main province of the state.
As of this writing2" there is no federal legislation prohibiting state re-
striction on the use of due-on-sales clauses. Thus, proponents of the
preemption analysis have been forced to rely on less clear manifesta-
tions of federal purpose.
The system of federally chartered savings and loan associations was
created by the Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933 (hereinafter referred to
to Congress," National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976), while the tenth
amendment has been described as a "truism," stating merely that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). Accordingly, the sole consti-
tutional grounds for invalidating federal law based on the clause have been findings that (1) there
was no rational basis for the congressional determination that regulated activity affected interstate
commerce, or (2) that there was no reasonable relation between the regulatory means chosen and
the avowed federal purpose. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262, 268
(1964). Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court's recent opinions in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1980), have made the
constitutionally mandated division of state and federal power somewhat uncertain.
By a bare majority, the Court in Usery apparently transformed the tenth amendment from a
truism to a potential curb on federal power. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court did so by
suggesting that where federal law is so intrusive as to undermine the States as sovereign entities, it
may be prohibited by the tenth amendment, even if it otherwise properly rests on the "plenary"
power of the Commerce Clause, 426 U.S. at 842-845. In a vigorous dissent Justice Brennan
charged the majority with a "patent usurpation of the role reserved for the political process by
their discovery in the Constitution of a restraint derived from sovereignty of the States." Id. at
858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Later and notwithstanding this "discovery," the Court in Hodel sustained the federal govern-
ment's power, to regulate the very use of land within a state's borders, a matter obviously affecting
the States' sovereign powers. 452 U.S. at 324. Surprisingly, Justice Rehnquist concurred in the
result without referring to the Court's previous decision in Usery. Id. at 307-13. Usery, left un-
described the various "attributes" of state sovereignty which might be insulated from federal regu-
lation by the tenth amendment. 426 U.S. at 845. Read broadly, Usery could stand for the
proposition that matters within the police power of the States may be entitled to tenth amendment
protection wherever conflicting federal law impacts upon the states as sovereign entities. In con-
trast, Hodel approved federal law intruding on the power of states to determine the use of land
within their boundaries, a matter seriously affecting the states' viability as sovereign entities them-
selves. While it is certainly possible to distinguish Hodel from Usery on the facts, the implications
of both leave the exact division of power between the state and federal spheres in doubt where
state police powers are involved. Should the Garn legislation be enacted insofar as it purports to
directly preempt state due-on-sales law applying to state chartered savings and loans and banks,
this division may be again examined.
19. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("historic police powers are not
superseded by the federal act unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"). See
also, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("The principle to be
derived from [the Supreme Court's] decisions is that federal regulation of a field of commerce
should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons").
20. No provision of the Homeowner's Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§1461-1470 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter referred to as HOLA] speaks to the issue of due-on-sales clauses. Sen-
ate Bill 1720, known as the "Depository and Institutions Insurance Act of 1981," contains lan-
guage preempting state law on due-on-sales for all commercial lenders. See S.1720, 97th Cong.
1st Sess. §141 (1981) (amending 12 U.S.C. §1735f-7. Senate Bill 1720 must still find its way
through various committees and be passed on affirmatively by the House.
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as HOLA)2 1 in the midst of the Depression to provide a response to a
state system of savings and loan rendered inadequate by dire economic
conditions.22 At that time, the FHLBB, which had been created by a
section of the earlier Federal Home Loan Bank Act23 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as FHLBA) was charged with the responsibility, "under such
rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organiza-
tion, incorporation, examination, operation and regulation" of federal
savings and loan associations by section 5(a) of HOLA.24 The congres-
sional grant of agency authority to the FHLBB through HOLA was
broad and vague. Aside from the power to promulgate rules and regu-
lations necessary to effectuate the creation, operation and regulation of
federal savings and loans, the Board was generally charged with the
mandate, in so doing, to give, "primary consideration to the best prac-
tices of local mutual thrift and home financing institutions in the
United States."25 Thus, the original Congressional grant of authority
might have been broad enough to authorize agency regulations pertain-
ing to federal savings and loans that promote the economic good health
and continued existence of such institutions. After this grant of author-
ity, the FHLBB proceeded to adopt various rules and regulations for
the administration of federal associations that have been characterized
as regulating these institutions from "cradle" to "corporate grave".26
Nonetheless, in all the years since HOLA's enactment, and even in the
face of the economic hard times suffered by savings and loans due to a
tight money supply and deregulation of the money market, Congress
has not created legislation prohibiting the states from restricting the use
of the due-on-sales clause by federal lenders.
In 1976, shortly after the appearance of Tucker v. Lassen Savings &
Loan Association27 and before Wellenkamp,28 the FHLBB promulgated
a regulation explicitly giving federal savings and loans the authoriza-
tion to include due-on-sales clauses in their standard loan agree-
ments.2 9 By its literal terms, the regulation was permissive only and
did not express any policy regarding the actual exercise of the clause.
However, the preamble to the regulation3" (an interpretive regulation
21. 12 U.S.C. §§1461-1470 (1976).
22. De la Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4922 & n.18.
23. 12 U.S.C. §1437 (1976).
24. 12 U.S.C. §1464(a) (1976).
25. Id.
26. People v. Coast Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
27. 12 Cal.3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974). Tucker prohibited the discre-
tionary exercise of due-on encumbrance clauses and formulated the test for unreasonable re-
straints on alienation further articulated in Wellenkamp. For a more detailed discussion of the
case, see note 1, supra.
28. See Crane, supra note 7, at 304.
29. 12 C.F.R. 545.8-3(0. For the full text of the regulation, see note 17, supra.
30. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,286, 18,287 (1976).
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at most3 1) proclaimed that it was the intent of the FHLBB in creating
the rule that the exercise of due-on-sales clauses be governed by federal
law without regard to state restrictions. This regulation and its pream-
ble are central to the lenders' preemption argument in De la Cuesta.
An agency regulation may serve to preempt state law, just as federal
legislation does.32 However, the regulation must be within the scope of
power delegated to the agency by Congress 33 and must reasonably re-
late to the purpose of the statute it serves.34 In turn, the original Con-
gressional action on which the regulation rests must have been
constitutionally permissible.35 The power of the FHLBB due-on-sales
regulation to preempt state law in De la Cuesta depends on its relation-
ship to HOLA, the original act creating the system of federal savings
and loans, and inferences that can be drawn about Congressional pur-
poses in creating it in 1933.
Preemption may be either express or implied.36 And, a "preemptive
regulation's force does not depend on express congressional authoriza-
tion to displace state law."37 If the scheme of legislation is so pervasive
that Congress left no room for state supplementation in the area, or if
the federal purpose is so dominant, "that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,"
then the state law must fall.38 Similarly, even where the federal legisla-
tive framework fails to occupy the entire field, state law will be invali-
dated when it "actually conflicts" with federal law.39 Actual conflict is
present when compliance with both state and federal law is impossi-
ble,4" or when state law frustrates the purposes of federal law.4'
Clearly, HOLA provides no explicit authorization for preemption of
state law relating to due-on-sales clauses-the specific issue had no oc-
casion to arise in the enactment of the statute in 1933.42 Preemption
here must rest on a more ambiguous ground, namely, the general pur-
pose of HOLA and the scope of authority to regulate originally dele-
gated to the FHLBB.
31. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 315-316 (1979).
32. See, Blum v. Bacon, 50 U.S.L.W. 4634, 4636-37 (U.S. June 14, 1982); Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663, 668 (1962).
33. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-382 (1961).
34. Id.
35. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1209 (1824); note 18, supra.
36. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
37. De la Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4919; see also 367 U.S. at 381-83.
38. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
39. See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 132 (1913); Florida-Lime & Avocado Grow-
ers, 373 U.S. at 142, 141-42 (dictum).
40. Id.
41. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941); see also Nash v. Florida Indust. Comm., 389
U.S. 235, 239 (1967); Jones v. Rath Packing, 430 U.S. at 526.
42. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§1461-1470.
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Proponents of the preemption argument assert that HOLA granted
the broadest plenary power to the FHLBB and that the dominant pur-
pose of the statute was to establish a system of federal savings and
loans to supplement beleaguered state associations in economic dis-
tress.43 This broad characterization of HOLA may lead to the conclu-
sion that any regulation promoting the economic health of federal
associations accomplishes the federal purpose.' But does such a broad
interpretation of HOLA also lead inexorably to the conclusion that it
authorizes serious intrusions into matters of special state concern so as
long as the intruding agency regulation can be reasonably related to
this vague, changing and essentially economic standard?
The mere presence of a federal regulatory agency with substantial
authority does not, without more, establish Congressional intent to pre-
empt state law.45 The exercise of state power may touch upon matters
of such local concern that it can coexist with an extensive federal regu-
latory framework.46 This has been particularly true where the state law
at issue emanates from the historical common law categories and is
concerned with adjusting the rights and liabilities of individuals rather
than creating a competing state regulatory scheme.47 There was ample
evidence before the Court in De la Cuesta that it was not the purpose of
Congress, when it authorized the chartering of federal savings and loan
associations, to also insulate them from state contract and property law,
thereby establishing a self-contained, segregated system dependent on
yet to be developed federal common law.
A different characterization of the original purpose of HOLA is justi-
fiable, that is, that federal savings and loans were created to provide a
quick and effective means to halt home foreclosures by the acquisition
and refinance of home loans. This required an infusion of mortgage
capital and a system similar to the bank federal reserve system for thrift
associations.48 The number of state associations was simply not suffi-
cient to accomplish this purpose.4 9 No evidence indicates that HOLA
was enacted to displace the state associations or to oust state law and
practices regarding savings and loans. In fact, the federal system of
43. See generally Jurisdictional Statement of Appellants at 13-24, De La Cuesta 50 U.S.L.W.
4916; Musacchio, supra note 7, at 231-233.
44. De la Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4923 ("Congress delegated power to the Board expressly
for the purpose of creating and regulating savings and loans as to ensure that they would remain
financially sound institutions.")
45. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrnTToNAL LAW, 386-90 (1978).
46. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963).
47. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966). But Sf., San
Diego Building and Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
48. See generally Brief of Michigan, supra note 10; 12 U.S.C. §1463 (repealed); 77 Cong. Rec.
2486 (April 27, 1933) (remarks of Representative Goldsborough).
49. See, e.g., 77 Cong. Rec. 4987 (June 5, 1933) (remarks of Senator Buckley); 77 Cong. Rec.
2487 (April 27, 1933) (remarks of Representative Reilly).
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national banks served as the model for the federal system of savings
and loans. And, at the time HOLA was enacted it was clear that the
contract rights of national banks were to be governed by state law.50 In
the light of the application of state law to national banks, it is doubtful
that Congress meant to deviate from this fundamental notion in the
creation of federal savings and loan associations. It is suggestive that
the Comptroller of the Currency has yet to promulgate a regulation
similar to the FHLBB rule for banks (though after De la Cuesta, such a
regulation is imminent) and that no federal preemption argument was
made in Wellenkamp, though the defendant Bank of America is a na-
tional bank.
51
Prior to De la Cuesta, dualistic governance of federal savings and
loan associations prevailed. 2 Matters directly relating to the charter-
ing, organization and internal regulation of these associations were
within the sole ambit of federal power and were established by myriad
FHLBB regulations.5 With respect to other matters, however, matters
that some courts and commentators have characterized as relating to
the external operation of these institutions, state law governed.
5 4
Before the appearance of De la Cuesta55 and in the absence of direct
Congressional direction, no one would have seriously suggested that
the federal charter of a savings and loan association rendered it im-
mune from state property taxes, zoning requirements and the like.5 6
State law was deemed to govern the contract and property rights of
these entities in their individual and "external" business transactions
with the citizens of a particular state, as well. 57  Section 8 of the
FHLBA, HOLA's precursor, seemed to acknowledge this.
5 8
Notwithstanding the important state concerns involved and the gen-
eralized federal purpose embodied in HOLA, the Supreme Court had
50. First National Bank of Louisville v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. 353, 362 (1870).
51. But see 46 Fed. Reg. 46, 964 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §30) (proposed September
23, 1981).
52. See generally 12 U.S.C. §1464(a) (Supp. 11 1978); Musacchio, supra note 7, at 226.
53. See Gulf Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 266
(5th Cir. 1981) cert. pending, No. 81-1744; Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471, 478 (Minn. 1981).
54. See Brief of Michigan, supra note 10, at 15-20; Gulf Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n., 651
F.2d 259; Holiday Acres No. 3, 308 N.W.2d 471. But cf., Conference of Federal Say. and Loan
Associations v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1979) a 'd, 445 U.S. 921 (1980).
55. See.De la Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4924 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 4926.
57. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979).
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest
requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed dif-
ferently .... The justifications for application of state law are not limited to ownership
interests; they apply with equal force to security interests, including the interest of a
mortgagee.
Id.
58. 12 U.S.C. §1437.
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little problem in concluding that state restrictions on the "flexible"5 9
FHLBB approach to due-on-sales clauses actually conflict with federal
law by frustrating its objective and purpose." Along with McCarty v.
McCarty61 and Ridgway v. Ridgway,62 De la Cuesta is another instance
of the Court's continued willingness to intrude on the police powers of
the states and to retreat from the development of a stricter preemption
standard where these state powers are involved.
Prior to the appearance of McCary and Ridgway, a narrower pre-
emption test had been applied by the Court when state law regarding
domestic relationships was subject to a preemption claim.6 3 In those
sorts of cases the Court demanded a showing that Congress had "posi-
tively required by direct enactment" that state law be preempted and,
secondly, that the state law in question "must do major damage" to the
"clear and substantiar' federal interest involved. 4 An equally narrow
standard might be justifiable when contract and property rights other
than those emanating from the marital estate are involved.
Though the Court in McCarty and Ridgway couched its approach in
the rubric of this two-part test, its actual analysis in each demonstrated
a retreat from these requirements and signaled an increased enthusiasm
for the use of the preemption docrine even where the state police power
is concerned." Similarly in De la Cuesta no special consideration for
state prerogatives was evinced because the state law at issue involved
matters within the state's ambit of control.6 6 It was enough for the pro-
ponents of preemption to logically link the most general characteriza-
tion of HOLA's original purpose in 1933 to the FHLBB regulation
made in 1976 and then to show a reasonable relation between the two.
If this is to be the Court's approach, particularly where the source of
preemption is attenuated from the direct expression of Congressional
will, what are the limits of encroachment on state perogatives through
preemption?
The issue to be resolved in De la Cuesta divided the Court.67 Justices
59. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4919.
60. Id., at 4920 n. 13.
61. 453 U.S. 210, 211 (1981). McCarty held California's community property law to be im-
pliedly preempted by the federal system of military retirement benefits. The issue has since been
directly addressed by Congress by legislation giving the military spouse an interest in retirement
benefits H.R. 749, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H5957 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1982).
62. 454 U.S. 46 (1981). Ridgway held that Maine's power to impose a constructive trust on
insurance proceeds pursuant to a final decree of dissolution incorporating a property settlement
agreement was impliedly preempted by the federal system of military insurance. Id. at 60.
63. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (citing United States v. Yazell, 382
U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
64. Id.
65. Bierman & Hershberger, Federal Preemption of State Family Property Law: The Marriage
of McCarty and Ridgeway, 14 PAC. L.J. 27 (1982).
66. De La Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4919 ("These principles [preemption] are not inapplicable
here simply because real property is a matter of special'concern to the States").
67. The majority opinion was written by Justice Blackmun. Justice Powell took no part in
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Rehnquist and Stevens dissented from the majority.68 In his dissent
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the FHLBB did have the author-
ity to promulgate regulations regarding due-on-sales clauses for feder-
ally chartered savings and loans, 69 but for him, the recognition of this
authority, and its relation to HOLA, did not also require a conclusion
that state law was preempted: "there is no indication in the FHLBA
that the Board may, by promulgating regulations, preempt those state
laws that are deemed to be economically unsound," and "there is no
indication in HOLA itself, or in its legislative history, that Congress has
empowered the Board to determine whether and when federal law shall
govern the enforceability of particular provisions contained in
mortgages."
70
Justice O'Connor, while joining in the majority result; felt con-
strained to concur.7 ' It was her concern that the majority's approach
might be interpreted to open the way for unlimited intrusion on state
power through preemption:
Nothing in the language of ... HOLA ... remotely suggests that
Congress intended to permit the Board to displace local laws ... not
directly related to savings and loan practices. Accordingly, in my
view, nothing in the Court's opinion should be read to the contrary.72
But the question remains: If no special showing of Congressional
intent to preempt or no real demonstration of the state law's actual
negative impact on the federal objective need be made, what practical
limitations on federal power through preemption exist, other than those
emanating from the fundamental concept of enumerated powers itself?
A brief analysis of the economic context of De la Cuesta indicates that
the deleterious effect of state restrictions on due-on-sales clauses would
have been difficult to demonstrate if "major damage" to the federal
purpose had to be shown before preemption could occur.
the decision. Justice O'Connor wrote a short, concurring opinion. Justice Rehnquist authored a
dissent in which Justice Stevens joined.
68. De la Cuesta, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4924-25.
69. Id. at 4925.
In declaring the due-on-sale clause enforceable as a matter of federal law. . . the Board
has departed from the approach contemplated by Congress. Although Congress has au-
thorized the Board to regulate the lending activities of federal savings and loan associa-
tions, there is no indication in HOLA itself, or in its legislative history, that Congress has
empowered the Board to determine whether and when federal law shall govern the en-
forceability of particular provisions contained in mortgages concluded by federal savings
and loan associations. If anything, section 8 of the FHLBA indicates that it was Con-
gress' understanding in 1932 that the enforceability of provisions in mortgages is a mat-
ter of state law.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 4924.
72. Id.
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III. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF DE L4 CUESTA.
Critics of the Wellenkamp decision have accused the California
Supreme Court of misapprehending the economic purpose and effect of
the due-on-sales clause in reaching its result.7 3 This charge is under-
stood in the context of Wellenkamp's specific facts.
In 1973 the Mans purchased property in Riverside county. $19,100
of the purchase price was financed through the Bank of America by the
Mans' promissory note in that amount secured by a deed of trust on
the property. The interest rate on the loan was 8%. In 1975 Cynthia
Wellenkamp bought the property and financed her purchase by paying
the Mans their equity in the property and agreeing to assume the bal-
ance of their loan with the Bank of America. A grant deed reflecting
the purchase was properly recorded and the bank was notified of the
assumption. Wellenkamp commenced making payments on the loan,
but the bank returned her first payment, and notified her that it would
waive its right to accelerate the outstanding balance due on the loan
only if she agreed to assume the loan at an increased interest rate. Wel-
lenkamp refused to accede to the increased rate. The Bank of America
instituted foreclosure proceedings and Wellenkamp then filed an action
in which she sought an injunction against enforcement of the due-on-
sales provision of the deed of trust and a declaration that the Bank's
exercise of the provision was an unreasonable restraint on alienation
absent a showing that the Bank's security had been impaired as a result
of the sale to her. The trial court sustained Bank of America's general
demurrer for failure to state a claim for relief on the ground that auto-
matic enforcement of the due-on-sales clause was valid under Califor-
nia law. On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed.74
Extending its holding in Tucker, the court in Wellenkamp required a
lender to demonstrate that the transfer of property will impair its secur-
ity before the due-on-sales clause may be enforced. 75 And, the court
made it clear that a showing of "impairment of security" could be gen-
erally satisfied only by proof of a transaction likely to cause physical
waste to the subject property or depreciation in its value.7 6 In reflecting
on this standard, commentators have observed that it makes exercise of
the due-on-sales clause almost impossible in all but the most unique
73. See generally, Crane, supra note 7; Musacchio, supra note 7; Pratt Report, The Due on
Sale Clause in California and Federally Chartered Sa ings andLoan Associations (copy on fie with
the Pacific Law Journal) (cited in Crane, supra note 7,passim); Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
Due-on-Sale Task Force Report (1982); Position Paper of California Banker's Association (copy
on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
74. Wellenkamp, 21 Cal.3d at 946-947, 582 P.2d at 971-72, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81.
75. Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
76. Id. at 951-953, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
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circumstances.77 The court rejected outright the argument that the
lender's generalized interest in maintaining its loan portfolio at current
interest rates justified the restraint occasioned by resort to the clause:
Although. . . we recognize that lenders face increasing costs of do-
ing business and must pay increasing amounts to depositors for the
use of their funds in making long term real estate loans as a result of
inflation and a competitive money market, we believe that exercise of
the due-on clause to protect against this kind of business risk would
not further the purpose for which the due-on clause was legitimately
designed, namely to protect against a lender's impairment of
security.
78
The "business risk" that the Court referred to seemed to entail only
the risk that inflation would cause a significant gap between the
amount of money being earned by lenders from interest paid on older
loans and the amount of money being paid out to depositors at current
interest rates. The court did not focus on the effect of sustained high
interest rates for new loan money on the average life expectancy of long
term loans made at earlier and more attractive rates.79 This omission
coupled with the Court's brief treatment of the actual economic reality
of real estate lending in California has led to much of the criticism of
Wellenkamp. A clearer picture of the economics involved in the deci-
sion emerges from the following information gathered from various
sources engaged in the general dispute.
In a position paper on the alleged effects of Wellenkamp submitted to
the California Legislature (hereinafter referred to as "Banker's paper"),
the California Banker's Association 80 asserted that prior to the sus-
tained upward spiral in interest rates, the real life of a fixed rate long
term loan, of for instance thirty years, was actually only 7.5 years in
California."' Thus, lenders could make long term funds available at
more attractive rates because they could rely on the estimate that 12%
of the population would move annually and that a concomitant termi-
nation of a significant percentage of their outstanding loans would take
place as new buyers opted for affordable new financing. 2 One might
say that the average life expectancy of long term loans at 7.5 years was
a fundamental assumption of lenders willing to make "long term"
77. Goodman, The Wellenkamp Decision: How Will It Affect Real Estate Financing, 54 CAL.
ST. B.J. 34, 38 (1979).
78. Wellenkamp, 21 Cal.3d at 951-53, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
79. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
80. California Banker's Association, The Wellenkamp Decision Position Paper (submitted by
the California Banker's Association in 1981 to members of the California Assembly in support of
Assembly Bill 2158) [hereinafter referred to as the Banker's Paper] (copy on file at the Pacific Law
Journal).
81. Id.passim.
82. See id. at 3.
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loans available to borrowers at attractive pre-spiral rates.83 Exercise of
the due-on-sales clause, then, could be viewed as a means to allow this
fundamental assumption to operate when extraordinary increase in in-
terests rates have made new buyers deviate from pre-spiral behavior.
In a report prepared by the Office of Policy Development and Re-
search of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in
1980, (hereinafter referred to as the Housing Conference Report of
1980)84 the Office concluded that, "a mortgage with a fixed interest rate
and a due-on-sales clause is equivalent to a renegotiable rate mortgage
with the provision that the rate will not change as long as the borrower
owns the house. 81 5 If interest rates increase beyond fundamental ex-
pectations, the value of the mortgage asset declines. This decline may
be characterized as a capital lOSS.8 6 This loss is further exacerbated if
changes in state law render the exercise of the due-on-sales clause in-
valid, even on the transfer of the property, because the expected life of
the loan will be extended.87 It has been estimated that the "losses"
resulting from the frustration of the expectation of actual loan life span
may rise as high as 600 to 800 million dollars annually for federal as-
sociations and up to 1.0 to 1.3 billion dollars for state and federal as-
sociations combined.
88
Losses of this magnitude may be difficult for the savings and loan
industry to absorb. The Housing Conference Report of 1980 marshals
statistics concerning the yield to debt ratio of the Federal National
Mortgage Association (hereinafter referred to as FNMA) as evidence
for the declining economic health of the thrift industry caused by Wel-
lenkamp. The Report asserts that in October of 1981 the yield on
FNMA's mortgage portfolio was 8.31%, while its average cost of debt
was 7.8%.89 By January of 1982 the yield was 9.25%, while cost of debt
was allegedly 10.01%.90 The Banker's paper asserts that this type of
trend should be especially sharp in the case of state associations which
have not been able to elude Wellenkamp. 
9
1
Prior to Wellenkamp the difference between the average maturity
83. See generally U.C.C. §2-615 and Official Comments (1977). See also Appleton, Kennon
& Pasternak, Wellenkamp v. Bank ofAmerica: Boon or Bane to the Consumer?, Los Angeles Daily
Journal, June 19, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
84. An Economic Analysis of Due-on-Sale Clauses, A Report Prepared by the Office of Policy
Development and Research, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development at the Request of
the 1980 Housing and Community Development Conference Report (1980) [hereinafter referred to
as the Housing Conference Report] (copy on file at the Pacc Law Journal).
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Due-on-Sale Task Force Report (1982) at 15 [here-
inafter referred to as Due-on-Sale Report].
89. The Housing Conference Report of 1980, supra note 84, at 9.
90. Id.
91. See The Banker's Paper, supra note 80, at 12.
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rates of loans originated by state and federal associations was approxi-
mately 8 months.9" Since 1977 (and due to Wellenkamp, the
Banker's paper asserts) the difference is 8.9 years to the disadvantage of
state associations.93 But, a simple comparison of the yield to debt ratios
of real property loans and inferences about thepossible impact of We!-
lenkamp-like restrictions on those relationships does not really give an
accurate picture of the economic condition of savings and loans. Such
analyses, based on linked steps of logical, but empirically unproven in-
ferences, have not established that state due-on-sales restrictions have a
major impact on the federal objective of fiscally stable associations.
The effect of Wellenkamp is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate
from the effects of inflation and deregulation of the money market in
general. Some believe that it is the strategy of federal associations to
exert leverage for advantageous due-on-sales legislation by threatening
to pull out of the real estate lending market altogether.94 The overall
good health of savings and loans is suggested by the California Real-
tors Association, which points to a Merrill Lynch Market Letter of July
12, 1982, reporting that savings and loan stocks as a class increased
4.4% in value in the second quarter of 1982, while the Dow Jones In-
dustrials suffered a 1.3% decline.95
While rising interest rates may have an uncertain impact on the over-
all condition of savings and loans, they have a stark effect on consum-
ers and the housing market. Rising interest rates create an economic
climate in which prospective home buyers, especially new buyers, may
not be able to purchase a home at all without the option of loan as-
sumption. If the due-on-sales clause were allowed to be automatically
enforced in the face of this reality, a generalized restraint on alienation
of property might obtain. It was this part of the economic picture with
which the court in Wellenkamp was especially concerned. 96
The California Board of Realtors estimates that approximately 80%
of the almost 5 million owner occupied homes in California are subject
to a mortgage that is assumable under California law.97 In 1980, about
75% of all sales depended on some form of assumption.98 The position
of realtors and consumers seems to be that the fixed rate loan itself is an
asset which belongs to the original buyer, an asset of great value in the
current economy that can justifiably be sold along with the property
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Opposition Statement of July 13, 1982, supra note 13, sec. II.F.
95. Id., sec. II. J.
96. Wellenkamp, 21 Cal3d at 950-951; 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
97. Opposition Statement of May 4, 1981, supra note 4, at 1.
98. Id., at 4.
1982 / Due-on-Sales Clauses in California
itself.9 9
It has been asserted that certain standard provisions in loan agree-
ments function in the nature of option contracts that, depending on the
particular provision, may benefit the original buyer or lender. 00 One
example of an option "embedded" within the loan agreement itself, is
the prepayment provision which allows the original debtor to prepay
the loan before it is due to avoid interest. This "option" allows the
borrower to exercise the prepayment alternative so that it functions as a
call option.' 10 If interest rates fall, the borrower may prepay or, in ef-
fect, buy the loan for the principle outstanding balance and take advan-
tage of lower interest rates that might be available with new financing.
The assumability of a loan may also be treated as an asset in the
nature of an option where the lender is prevented from exercising the
due-on-sales clause on transfer or further encumbrance of the property.
If the original buyer may transfer the property to a new owner and the
lender nevertheless may not call the loan due, then the homeowner has
a put option and, in effect, is forcing sale of the loan (by forcing its
extension beyond its natural life) to the lender at the original interest
rate. Were the due-on-sales provision enforceable, the lender, rather
than the borrower would possess the option and it too would be in the
nature of a put option, forcing the sale of the mortgage to the original
homeowner at the price of the original outstanding balance.1
0 2
The value of the assumability "option" in the hands of the home
owner has been estimated to equal about 10% of the selling price of a
similar home without such financing. 10 3 The real value of the option
may be incalculable, if the presence of an assumable loan determines
whether the home owner can sell his home at all. Realtors assert that
in the current depressed housing market, sales are necessitatious-
transactions are initiated because of job transfers, dissolutions of mar-
riage, deaths, and the like."° Nonetheless, half of the 500,000 homes
currently on the market will not sell at all.'05 According to market
analyses conducted by the California Association of Realtors, further
restrictions on loan assumptions may reduce already depressed sales by
25%. 106
Aside from the impact on the 110,000 families who could neither buy
99. See generally Opposition Statement of July 13, 1981 supra note 13; Opposition Statement
of May 4, 1981, supra note 4.
100. The Housing Conference Report, supra note 84, at 10-15.
101. Id. at 10-11.
102. Id. 12-15.
103. Banker's Paper, supra note 80, at 13.
104. Opposition Statement of July 13, supra note 13, sec. II.B.
105. Id.
106. Id., see. IV.D.
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nor sell property due to this decline in possible home sales,10 7 substan-
tial revenue loss to the state may occur as well. Realtors assert that the
aggregate value of one resale of an existing housing unit in 1981 was
approximately $22,666.108 This figure is derived from direct expendi-
tures, transaction costs and use of retained equity.0 9 Even without the
presence of a multiplier factor added to the hard economic value of the
transaction, the decline in sales caused by acceleration is estimated to
deprive the state economy of about 1 billion dollars annually with a
loss in government revenue of more than 600 million dollars per
year." If these figures even remotely indicate the true picture, the
state has a clear economic interest beyond the concerns voiced in Wel-
len/camp in having its own law prevail.
In opposition to these consumer oriented arguments regarding the
"ownership" of the option, lenders charge that prohibitions on due-on-
sales clauses will have an impact on the secondary money market that
has and will continue to shrink the amount of loan funds made avail-
able for California housing. Thus, they assert that the Wellenkamp
case and similar results, in the long run, will actually harm consumers
by causing sources of financing to become unavailable.
Put very simply, money for housing acquisition depends on a recur-
rent supply, or influx, of loan money from the secondary money mar-
kets. 1" The continuing interest payments of debtors to lenders can not
alone regenerate funds necessary for new loan money. Thus, differen-
tial long-term mortgages are discounted to institutions in the secondary
market in multi-million dollar blocks to generate a new supply of
money; the institutions in turn sell interests in them to investors."12
One obvious effect of prohibitions against exercise of due-on-sales
clauses is to make loan documents sold on the secondary market from
states following some form of Wellenkamp policy nonstandard. Aside
from the impact on uniformity of loan instruments, lenders argue with
some force that mortgages and deeds of trust that do not contain exer-
cisable due-on-sales clauses simply won't be attractive items for sale on
the secondary market.' The two institutions that mediate between
lenders seeking to sell mortgages and investors wishing to buy them are
the FHMA and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC).
107. Id., sec. lI.D.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id., sec. IV.D.
111. Seegeneraly The Pratt Report, supra note 73; the Banker's Paper, supra note 80 at 7-10.
112. The Banker's Paper, supra note 80 at 7-10.
113. See Advisory Opinion of the FHLBB, Resolution No. 75-647, in Schott v. Mission Fed-
eral Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. Civ.-75-366, at 30 (CD Cal., July 30, 1975). The FHLBB, in pub-
lished statements concerning the proposed rule stated: "elimination of the due-on-sale clause will
restrict and impair the ability of Federal associations to sell their home loans in the secondary
mortgage market." 41 Fed. Reg. 6283, 6285 (1976).
18
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California is heavily dependent on an inflow of mortage money from
the secondary market to fuel its higher than average demand for home
financing, because it is a state with a growing population and a housing
shortage. 1 4 The Banker's paper asserts that since 1977, the FHLMC
alone has "imported" into California more than 10 billion dollars of
loan funds." 5 And, the association posits that California's diminishing
sales of loans to the secondary market (approximately 15%) since 1977
is primarily attributable to Wellenkamp. I 6 The Bankers' partial survey
of savings and loan associations indicates that perhaps as much as 1
billion dollars of needed loan monies which could have emanated from
the secondary market were diverted to other sources in the two years
following Wellenkamp. 11
7
One of the greatest problems stemming from the controversy about
the effect of due-on-sales clauses is that no really reliable economic in-
formation is available to determine the true effect of prohibitions on
the exercise of the clause on the health of the savings and loan industry
and generally on the supply of loan funds.' This is true because it is
difficult to isolate the effect of Wellenkamp from the overall impact of
strict monetary policies that have driven up interest rates. Deregula-
tion of the money market alone is an additional factor which would
have had a significant impact on the health of the industry, absent Wel-
lenkamp ." 9 Consumers and realtors argue that there is simply a
smaller volume of available mortgage money coming from the secon-
dary market due to tight monetary policy and investor movement into
other, more profitable activities. 20 Thus, a simple decline in mortgages
sold on the secondary market establishes little or nothing about the real
impact of Wellenkamp on the loan supply.
Further, while the FHMA and the FHLMC currently oppose
prohibitions on the exercise of due-on-sales clauses,' 2 ' it is questiona-
ble that these two dominating and government supported mediating
institutions could or would pull out of Wellenkamp jurisdictions alto-
gether. Currently, about 35% of FHLMC's portfolio is held in Califor-
nia. 2 2 These institutions are dependent on these sources of loans to
sell to a great extent and can not exhibit perfect market behavior in the
face of arguably less appealing loan paper. What may be true is that
114. The Banker's Paper, supra note 80, at 8-9.
115. Id. at 7.
116. Id. at 8.
117. Id., at 9.
118. The Housing Conference Report, supra note 84, at 9, 14 n.10.
119. See generally, Opposition Statement of July 13, 1981, supra note 13, sec. II.F.; Opposition
Statement of May 4, 1981, supra note 4, at 6.
120. Id.
121. See July 2, 1982 Announcement of the FHLMC sent to Mortgage Corporation Seller
Services [hereinafter referred to as July FHLMC Announcement].
122. Peninsula Times Tribune, July 18, 1981, at El, col. 3.
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the extent to which the amount of available loan money from the sec-
ondary market in California, and in other jurisdictions following a
Wellenkamp result, has declined in excess of the national average, the
decline may be partially attributable to the prohibitions against the
due-on-sales clause. Concomitantly, the current condition of the sav-
ings and loan industry is probably exacerbated by the inability of some
associations from some jurisdictions to limit the life span of long term
loans through the mechanism of the due-on-sales clause. This uncer-
tainty about the actual effect of the due-on-sales clause is especially
problematic because a clear showing of such effect and its real impact
on federal objectives should be demonstrated before the contract and
property law of the States is displaced by federal policy.
IV. DE L.4 CutESTA-THE AFTERMATH
During the pendency of De la Cuesta intense political activity over
the due-on-sales controversy occurred on both state and federal levels.
The actual appearance of the case intensified this activity and its result
added a new dimension to the drama. What follows is a brief descrip-
tion of recent events surrounding the issue.
A4. The California Experience
By its appearance in June, the De la Cuesta opinion contributed to a
further stagnation of the housing market in California.1 23 It also in-
creased pressure on the legislative and executive branches of state gov-
ernment to provide state savings and loans parity with federal
associations over the due-on-sales issues. While efforts by the Califor-
nia State Commissioner of Savings and Loans to achieve parity by sim-
ple regulation appear blocked, 4 De la Cuesta may break the
legislative stalemate over the assumption issue that has existed in Cali-
fornia since shortly after Wellenkamp's appearance.
As early as 1979, a bill sponsored by the California Savings and
Loan League was introduced in the legislature, Assembly Bill 848, to
reverse both Wellenkamp, and its precursor, Tucker. Consumer and
realtor opposition was intense and the bill never came to a vote on the
Assembly floor. In 1980-81, two attempts were made to legislatively
overrule Wellenkamp. Assembly Bill 2158, sponsored by the California
Banker's Association, was given extensive scrutiny in committee, but
no final action was ever taken in the face of fierce opposition to it by
consumers and realtors.
With the appearance of De la Cuesta, efforts to achieve a legislative
123. Conversation with Staff, California Association of Realtors, September 7, 1982.
124. 703 Op. AIr'y GEN. 6 (1982). [Hereinafter Op. A'r'y GEN.].
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solution to the state/federal distinction over due-on-sales clauses were
again renewed. This time, the interested factions engaged in "settle-
ment" negotiations designed to result in a bill that would be acceptable
to all.'25 The basis of these discussions revolved around the so-called
"blended rate" approach. A blended rate involves the adjustment of
interest rate on funds to be used to finance a home purchase that re-
flects a "blend" of the interest rate on the original obligation with pre-
vailing interest rates for new loan money.1 26 Realtors and lenders were
unable to agree on what amount of the financed purchase would be
subject to the blended rate, 27 that is, whether all of the amount
financed would be subject to the mix up to 80% of the new purchase
price, or whether the blend would apply only to the amount of the orig-
inal loan, with full market rates obtaining for new financing. As a re-
sult of this impasse, no legislation emerged from the just ended 1981-82
session; it is expected that even more sustained efforts will be made in
the next session to achieve a legislative compromise on the issue.1
28
De la Cuesta may have helped to intensify the movement of state
chartered savings and loans to the federal system. Since 1981, 32 Cali-
fornia state savings and loans have transferred to the federal system or
merged with federal associations.'29 In 1979, section (a) of HOLA was
amended to permit state associations to convert to federal charter.
30
While the disparity between state and federal savings and loans over
due-on-sales clauses increases the attractiveness of federal conversion,
the major impetus for the trend may be the ability of state associations
to make interstate acquisitions. 3 1  Nonetheless, shortly after De la
Cuesta's appearance, Linda Tsao Yang, the California State Commis-
sioner of Savings and Loans, sought to issue a regulation that would
have had the effect of immunizing state associations from Wel-
lenkamp.132 On August 17, 1982, the California State Attorney Gen-
eral's Office issued its opinion asserting that the Commissioner lacked
the power to establish parity by regulation.'33 Because the opinion was
125. Tentative Proposal, supra note 15.
126. Id.
127. Telephone conversations with staffs of California Assemblyman Jim Costa and the Cali-
fornia Association of Realtors, September 1, 1982.
128. Id.
129. Conversation with Robert Wolfe, supra note 8.
130. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-630,
92 Stat. 3641.
131. Conversation with Robert Wolfe, supra note 8.
132. See generally Op. ATr'Y GEN., supra note 124. The then Commissioner asserted her abil-
ity to grant parity pursuant to California Finance Code section 5500.5, which provides in pertinent
p Whenever by statute or regulation there is extended to federal institutions doing business
in this state... any right, power, privilege, or duty not authorized herein to domestic
associations, the commissioner may by regulation extend to domestic associations such
right, power, privilege, or duty.
133. Op. Arr'Y GEN., supra note 124, at 4-6.
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limited to the interpretation of the powers of the Commissioner given
by the particular statute, intriguing state constitutional questions re-
garding separation of powers were never reached.'34 As will be dis-
cussed below, the California Supreme Court has continued to judicially
extend Wellenkamp notwithstanding the pendency of De la Cues/a in
the United States Supreme Court or the feverish activity the contro-
versy has engendered in the state legislative and executive branches.' 35
B. Dawn Investment Co.
In early February 1982, the California Supreme Court made its first
major decision concerning the due-on-sales controversy since Wel-
lenkamp_136 Notwithstanding the terrific controversy Wellenkamp
has created, the pendency of De la Cues/a, or the legislative attempts to
overturn Wellenkamp (and similar policies followed by other states),
the California Supreme Court responded to questions left open by the
original decision and extended Wellenkamp to new situations. 37 From
a judicial perspective, easy assumability is still the public policy of the
state.
Wellenkamp was limited by the Court's holding to its specific facts,
that is, a transfer of residential property. The issues of prohibition
against exercise of the due-on-sales clause for commercial property or
non-institutional lenders were left unanswered. Dawn Investment spe-
cifically involved the exercise of the due-on-sales clause in a second
deed of trust in the sale of a 16 unit apartment house. 38 When the
property was resold, the holders of the second deed of trust refused to
accept installment payments made by the new buyers and proceeded to
accelerate the balance due through the due-on-sales clause. The new
buyers sought injunctive relief to prevent the sale of the property after
their refusal to pay the accelerated loan balance. The trial court
granted the injunction and the private lenders petitioned for a writ of
mandate to compel vacation of the injunction. The California
Supreme Court denied the writ and made it clear that the policy of
Wellenkamp is to obtain generally in California.
3
1
In reaching this result the Court surveyed Wellenkamp and related
cases. In so doing it again rejected outright the economic argument of
lenders that the need to maintain a sound investment portfolio justifies
resort to the clause. In stark contrast, the economic impact on federal
134. Id.
135. Seegenerally Dawn Investment Co. v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal.3d 695, 639 P.2d 979, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 332 (1982).
136. Id.
137. Id., at 700-02; 639 P.2d at 976-78, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35.
138. Id., at 697; 639 P.2d at 974-75, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
139. See id. at 699-704 639 P.2d at 975-79, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 333-37.
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savings and loans of restrictions on acceleration was a key part of the
federal De la Cuesta litigation.
The private lenders in Dawn argued that their situation differed from
that of the Bank of America in Wellenkamp for a number of reasons.
40
First, they asserted that private lenders lack the resources necessary to
establish impairment of security as required to be shown by We-
lenkamp. Next, petitioners argued that since private lending is nor-
mally short term, the quantum of restraint occasioned by resort to the
due-on-sales clause would be slight. The court found that this argu-
ment cut both ways-the "temporary" nature of this type of financing
also reduced the need of the lender to accelerate and so reduced the
interest to be balanced against the restraint created. In addition, the
court brushed aside the petitioner's argument that their inability to
spread the loss of a bad transaction should give them a greater interest
in acceleration on transfer. The court summarily rejected petitioner's
argument concerning their need to use the due-on clause to make relia-
ble projections of economic status, an argument similar to the one
made by institutional lenders in Wellenkamp and in De la Cuesta.1
4
1
When faced with the question of applying Wellenkamp to commer-
cial sales of property, the court used an almost identical analysis of the
issue as had been made in Wellenkamp itself to justify extension of the
rule.' 42 Ironically, in so doing, the court approved the disposition of
the De la Cuesta case made previously by a California intermediate
appellate court; this disposition was later overturned by the United
States Supreme Court. Thus, after De la Cuesta and in the absence of
any state legislative overruling of Wellenkamp or Dawn, a chaotic situ-
ation exists in California. Private lenders and the savings and loans
that remain in the state system will be prevented from exercising due-
on-sales clauses, whereas federal lenders protected by De la Cues/a will
be free to accelerate on transfer. If federal legislation is enacted pre-
empting state law regarding due-on-sales clauses for all institutional
lenders, only private persons will be prevented from accelerating loan
obligations on their purchaser's resale to another buyer.
C. The Garn Legislation, Converted Associations and Impairment of
Contract Rights
In 1981, Senator Gan of Utah introduced a massive and controver-
sial omnibus bill affecting various aspects of the financial industry.'4 3
Among its many sections Senate Bill 1720 contains a provision pre-
140. Id. at 700-02, 639 P.2d at 976-78, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35.
141. Id. at 701-02, 639 P.2d at 977, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
142. Id. at 702-04, 639 P.2d at 978-79, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 335-37.
143. S. 1720, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., §141 (1981).
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empting state law on due-on-sales clauses."' Testimony was first taken
on the bill in October of 1981. On August 19, 1982, it was passed out
of the Senate Banking Committee after extensive amendment but with
a due-on-sales provision still intact. This proposed legislation must still
be acted on by various committees and then be passed on affirmatively
by the House.
1 45
Senate Bill 1720 attempts a compromise on the due-on-sales issue
and a finesse of the constitutional issue raised by federal legislation
affecting state and federal lenders. It provides that due-on-sales clauses
may be exercised by state lenders notwithstanding state restrictions, but
not until January of 1986 so that a "window" period is provided.1
46 If
during this window period the various state legislatures do not overtly
adopt restrictions on the use of due-on-sale provisions, they are deemed
to have acquiesced in the exertion of federal power. No window ap-
plies to federal associations-they are treated as having had the right to
accelerate without regard to state restrictions at least as long as the
FHLBB's 1976 regulation and perhaps before that. 147 In this way, the
Gan Legislation anticipated the outcome of De la Cuesta.
If Senate Bill 1720 does become law, the status of converted associa-
tions will still be in doubt. Are they to be treated as state institutions
and subject to the window or not? Of course, with respect to loans
made after their conversion, these newly created "federal" associations
claim that as federal savings and loans they are not subject to state
restrictions on due-on-sales clauses. Even more startlingly, they have
announced their intention to exercise rights under due-on-sales clauses
in loan agreements executed while under state charter.' 48 The problem
of converted associations has already found its way into the California
courts in what may be the test case on the subject. Arnstein et. al. v.
World Savings and Loan ,14 an action seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief and damages for interference with contract, with prospective
economic advantage and for slander of title was filed in the California
Superior Court, on August 18, 1982. In this case, plaintiff homeowners
allege that the June 1982 resale of their home was frustrated when
World Savings and Loan Association ("hereinafter "World") notified
the new buyers of its intention to accelerate the balance due on the
original loan unless they agreed to assume the loan at a higher interest




147. See generally note 13, supra.
148. See, Opposition Statement of July 13, 1981, supra note 13.
149. No. Civ. 506095 (Santa Clara Co. Sup. Ct. filed August 18, 1982).
150. Plaintiffs Complaint, Arnstein at 3-4.
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mains unsold.'-'
In Arnstein, the loan at issue had been made in 1978 when World
was still a California state association. In 1981 it converted to a federal
charter.15 2 Apparently, it wasn't until De la Cuesta appeared that
World notified the parties of its intention to exercise the due-on-sales
clause. By that time, the contract for sale had been executed and es-
crow had opened on the sale.153 The success of the plaintiffs' claims for
relief in Arnstein will depend on whether or not the court determines
that World's current federal status, and thus its claim to the protection
of De la Cuesta, operates to insulate it from state law relevant to loans
made prior to its conversion. Because the exercise of federal power is
not restricted by the limitations of the contract clause of the United
States Constitution, 154 any legal impediment to absolute federal protec-
tion is unclear. Without this protection, however, World's refusal to
accede to the transaction and its threat to exercise the due-on-sales
clause might provide the basis for the related causes of action plead.
The California Realtors Association is concerned that the FHLBB will
facilitate this effort by issuing an advisory opinion that converted as-
sociations can apply De la Cuesta to all mortgages in their portfolios
without regard to status of the association at their origin.
1 55
The FHLMC jumped into the controversy adding its own leverage
by announcing a change in its due-on-sales policy on July 2, 1982 that
would have prohibited the future assumability of all mortgages owned
in whole or in part by the corporation, subject to applicable state
law.'5 6 Thus, all loans held by FHLMC that originated from federal
lenders (and presumably converted associations) would have been sub-
ject to automatic acceleration by FHLMC on transfer "with no option
for rate increase unless the Seller elects to repurchase the loan from the
corporation".' 57 The effective date of this proposed change has been
delayed to January 1983, in anticipation of S. 1720.158 If converted
savings and loan associations are allowed to accelerate loan obligations
made during their state status, or if some version of the Gan legisla-
tion emerges from Congress preempting state law on the issue for all
commercial lenders, is there a basis for preserving the contract and
property rights of individual debtors on these loans?
As mentioned above, thefederal government is not prevented by the
151. See id.
152. Id. at 2, 4.
153. See Id. at 4, 5.
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 10.
155. See, Opposition Statement of July 13, 1981, supra note 13.
156. July FHLMC Announcement, supra note 121.
157. Id.
158. Conversation with Ron Kingston, California Association of Realtors on September 2,
1982.
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Contract Clause' 59 from impairing contract rights. This is a provision
that has served to limit the power of states in relation to their citi-
zens.' 60 Nonetheless, arguments against federal intrusion on contract
rights have been made through the medium of substantive due pro-
cess.' 61 The characterization by realtors and consumers of the due-on-
sales clause as a put option and one that ought to be the property of the
home owner, supports these sorts of arguments in resistance to the fed-
eral trend. The California Realtors Association estimates that the asset
"transfer" to lenders from owners occasioned by free exercise of due-
on-sales clauses in California may rise as high as 1 billion dollars in the
next few years.' 62 Thus, the focus of the due-on-sales controversy has
again shifted-this time the issues will involve some novel approaches
to constitutional law.
V. CONCLUSION
Though the federal legislation involved in De la Cuesta and the spe-
cific basis of the preemption claim-an agency regulation-are not
identical to those found in McCarty and Ridgway, the opinion still
stands with recent Supreme Court cases effectuating preemption of
state law involving the police power.
Along with decisions like McCarty and Ridgway, De la Cuesta stands
as another inroad to state prerogatives and a demonstration of the vi-
tality of the preemption doctrine in the hands of the Burger Court.
While the Garn legislation, if passed, may make the specific issue of De
la Cuesta old news, the opinion will remain important for its implica-
tions regarding the changing relationship between the state and federal
spheres of influence.
De la Cuesta is a practical "landmark" as well. It contributes to the
transformation of the dual system of state and federal savings and loan
associations to a unitary one. When HOLA was enacted in 1933, sav-
ings and loan associations were solely state phenomena. HOLA cre-
ated the alternative system of federal associations. It is ironical that
now, in 1982, as it has been used to rationalize the preemption result of
De la Cuesta, HOLA may be the destructive mechanism of state sav-
ings and loans. At the least, hindsight will show that De la Cues/a had
a great effect on state and federal legislative innovations in real
property finance. Most importantly, in its approach to preemption De
la Cuesta raises serious questions about the limits of federal power ex-
erted through the supremacy clause.
159. U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 10 ("No State shall... pass any law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts").
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